Plenary Paper – 2024 Rule of Law Report: Safeguarding the Foundations of the Union Assessing the Rule of Law Situation in the European Union

Challenges, Fractures, and Future Directions for a Legitimate and Resilient Rule of Law Framework in the EU

The rule of law is a non-negotiable principle anchored in the Treaties and entrusted to the Commission as part of its core mandate. The Commission’s 2024 report highlights notable progress across Member States, alongside persistent sectoral contrasts and structural divergences. Yet the issue is contested today both in Western and Eastern Europe, revealing a deeper crisis of legitimacy. This does not mean that our standards should be lowered—on the contrary, defending the rule of law in Europe requires an effective, transparent, and consistent institutional response. But it also calls for a deeper reflection on the roots of this erosion of legitimacy. To restore the value of the rule of law, we must reconnect with the historical traditions that shaped its emergence, and relocate the functioning of our limited institutions within a broader political ideal, one that affirms a way of life grounded in informed citizenship, constrained power, and shared responsibility. This vision is the foundation of our European polity.

Rechtsstaat, État de droit, rule of law — three expressions with subtle distinctions, all referring to the principle that state power, especially executive authority, must be constrained by law.

Whether approached formally, as in Kelsen’s hierarchy of norms, or substantively through the lens of natural rights, the rule of law remains a cornerstone of liberal political order.

The European Commission’s annual Rule of Law Report, introduced under Ursula von der Leyen’s 2019 agenda, has become a central instrument for monitoring the democratic health of Member States. Its relevance has grown in the wake of repeated concerns, particularly regarding Hungary and, until recently, Poland under the PiS government. This initiative emerged in response to the “twin rule of law crisis” of 2018, marking a shift toward more active EU engagement in upholding core democratic standards.

Yet the Commission’s approach to the rule of law does not align fully with constitutional review as carried out by the Court of Justice of the European Union, nor with the protection of individual rights under the European Court of Human Rights. Instead, it constitutes a novel form of institutional oversight, namely a political evaluation of the democratic quality of national regimes.

This involves cross-cutting assessments of judicial independence, anti-corruption frameworks, media pluralism, separation of powers, and access to information. The Commission fully assumes its role as guardian of the Treaties and promoter of the rule of law, in accordance with the principle of equal treatment between Member States. It emphasizes the added value of structured dialogue with national authorities and parliaments, and rejects any accusations of political interference, grounding its actions in a clear legal basis — Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union — and in a transparent methodological framework.

At Ave Europa, we recognise the necessity of such a mechanism. The rule of law is not simply a domestic concern; it underpins mutual trust, legal certainty, and the proper functioning of key European achievements, from the single market to the Schengen area. Without independent courts, effective anti-corruption safeguards, and free media, there can be no uniform application of EU law.

These are not abstract values: they are the foundations of a cohesive European polity.

1- Trust and Cooperation at Risk

Trust and cooperation within the European Union are fundamentally dependent on the rule of law. Its erosion is not merely a legal issue; it directly affects the functioning of core European policies and mechanisms such as the Schengen Zone and the Dublin Convention. When some Member States fail to implement shared agreements—particularly in areas as sensitive as migration and asylum, others begin to lose trust in the system, prompting unilateral responses such as the reintroduction of internal border controls.

This breakdown of mutual trust reveals the far-reaching and systemic consequences of undermining judicial independence and disregarding rule of law standards. The 2024 Rule of Law Report reiterates that such erosion compromises not only the integrity of national democratic institutions but also the foundational principles of European integration.

Legal certainty, the independence of the judiciary, and the accountability of public institutions are not optional—they are essential prerequisites for cooperation among Member States and for the mutual recognition of legal systems.

a. The Rule of Law as a precondition for EU cooperation

The report affirms that the rule of law is a precondition for the effective functioning of EU cooperation mechanisms. Instruments such as the Schengen Area, the Dublin Regulation, and the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions all rely on the assumption that each Member State upholds an equivalent standard of judicial protection, procedural fairness, and institutional independence.

When this assumption is undermined, whether by politicised courts, pervasive corruption, or systemic violations of judicial independence, mutual trust collapses. In such scenarios, states may resort to emergency measures or act unilaterally, weakening the collective architecture of the Union.

b. Concrete consequences: border controls and legal fragmentation

The consequences of this deterioration are already tangible.

The report highlights how internal border controls, reintroduced by several Member States in response to perceived deficiencies in asylum enforcement or broader concerns over rule of law compliance, represent a visible symptom of eroding confidence in the uniform application of EU rules.

Legal fragmentation soon follows, as judicial decisions are no longer automatically enforced across borders due to doubts about the fairness of trials or the independence of national courts, a concern already addressed in several landmark rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union. This undermines and, in the long-run, compromises the coherence of the European legal space.

c. Political implications: conditionality and strategic tension

Politically, the erosion of the rule of law has created tensions over the legitimacy of shared obligations and the equitable distribution of responsibilities.

The Commission warns that such breaches pose a direct threat to the stability of the EU legal order, particularly in politically sensitive domains such as migration management, cross-border criminal justice, and fiscal cooperation.

As a result, the Union has begun deploying financial conditionality tools to enforce compliance. Under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation1 (2020/2092), Member States that fail to uphold fundamental rule of law principles may face the suspension or redirection of EU funds. This shift reflects a growing recognition that the rule of law is not only a foundational value but also a structural necessity for the functioning, cohesion, and legitimacy of the European Union as a whole.

2- Methodology

Since its introduction in 2020, the European Commission’s Rule of Law Report has become the cornerstone of the EU’s efforts to assess and protect democratic standards across the Union.

Its methodology is both comprehensive and evolving. The report provides a country-specific and comparative overview of developments in Member States, structured around four consistent pillars: judicial systems, anti-corruption frameworks, media pluralism and freedom, and institutional checks and balances. Each Member State is evaluated against the same four core areas.

The report is based on a multi-source qualitative methodology: it integrates written contributions from Member States, country visits by Commission officials, targeted consultations with stakeholders from civil society, the judiciary, academia, and the private sector, as well as reports from international organisations — notably the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission. It also draws on internal data, Eurobarometer surveys, and jurisprudence from both national and EU courts. This common framework applies equally to all Member States, on the basis of equal treatment and a shared set of indicators, and may be extended to candidate countries where relevant.

Under judicial systems, the report examines the independence of judges, the procedures for the appointment and dismissal of magistrates, the functioning of judicial councils, the resources allocated to the judiciary, and both access to justice and the overall efficiency of judicial processes.

Regarding anti-corruption frameworks, it assesses national strategies, preventive mechanisms such as asset declarations and conflict of interest rules, repressive tools including investigations and prosecutions, protection measures for whistleblowers regardless of the transposition status of the relevant EU directive, as well as national alert and monitoring systems.

In terms of media freedom and pluralism, the report reviews transparency in media ownership, the independence of regulatory bodies, the existence of political or economic pressure on journalists, documented threats or acts of violence against media actors, and the autonomy of public service media.

The final pillar, institutional checks and balances, encompasses the quality and transparency of legislative processes, the role and effectiveness of constitutional courts or equivalent bodies, the separation of powers among branches of government, the functioning of independent authorities such as ombudsmen, electoral commissions and anti-corruption agencies, as well as the state of civic space, including freedom of association, NGO funding and pressures on civil society organisations.

The 2024 edition confirms the consolidation of this process and introduces three major methodological innovations.

First, a stronger linkage is now established between the report’s findings and the EU budget: compliance with recommendations may condition access to Union funds, particularly under the forthcoming Multiannual Financial Framework.

Second, the follow-up on previous recommendations is more structured, with specific attention given to the pace and quality of implementation.

Third, the thematic scope of the report is expanded to include the consequences of rule of law deficiencies on the Single Market, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), thus integrating economic impacts into the legal and political analysis.

The report does not seek to impose uniform legal solutions. Rather, its central aim is to prevent, address, and reduce systemic risks to the rule of law, and to foster a shared European culture of democratic governance. The approach is dialogical, evidence-based, and sensitive to national specificities, while remaining firmly anchored in the values of Article 2 TEU.

2- Assessment

One of the most encouraging developments in the Rule of Law reporting cycle is the steadily increasing rate of implementation of the Commission’s recommendations by Member States.

After 65% of the 2022 recommendations were followed up with concrete actions, that figure rose to 68% in 2023. These measures range from legislative reforms and the tabling of draft laws to public consultations and administrative restructuring.

Of all recommendations issued in 2023, 20% have been fully implemented according to the Commission’s standards, 37% are partially implemented with ongoing reforms, 50% are currently under review or discussion, while 13% have yet to elicit any tangible response.

Notably, 16 Member States have adopted legislative reforms in direct response to the 2023 recommendations, and 9 have launched public consultations or action plans, though without formal legislative outcomes at the time of the report.

Substantively, the areas most impacted by reforms were judicial systems and anti-corruption frameworks. These included changes to the composition and independence of judicial councils, new asset declaration requirements for public officials, and strengthened protections for whistleblowers, in line with Directive (EU) 2019/1937.

By contrast, reforms under the pillars of media pluralism and institutional checks and balances have been more limited. Issues such as the independence of media regulators, the transparency of political financing, and safeguards for civil society have seen comparatively less legislative engagement. This asymmetry suggests that while core legal institutions are being fortified, more politically sensitive or structurally diffuse areas of democratic accountability still face inertia or resistance in several Member States.

3- Judicial Independence: Progress and Setbacks

Judicial independence is a non-negotiable prerequisite for the functioning of the EU. Without it, member states cannot trust each other to implement agreements, respect EU law, or cooperate in common projects like the Single Market or Schengen.

a. Progress across several Member States

The 2024 Rule of Law Report highlights tangible improvements in the independence of judicial systems in a number of EU countries.

Italy adopted reforms to reduce the influence of politics within the judiciary, including new rules on the composition and functioning of the High Council of the Judiciary. Greece made advances in judicial appointment procedures, aiming to enhance transparency and reduce discretionary political influence. Belgium and Austria introduced or expanded safeguards for magistrates, including reforms on evaluation criteria and promotion pathways designed to shield judges from undue interference. Finland was commended for maintaining consistently high standards of judicial independence, particularly in its judicial appointment processes and internal accountability mechanisms.

In total, 16 Member States adopted or proposed reforms in 2023 specifically addressing judicial independence, with particular emphasis on procedures for appointment and promotion, disciplinary processes, and the governance structures of judicial councils.

b. Setbacks and concerns in a few Member States

Despite overall progress, the Commission also notes several persistent or emerging challenges that continue to undermine judicial independence in certain Member States.

In Hungary, structural concerns remain regarding the independence of the judiciary, particularly the extensive powers exercised by the President of the National Office for the Judiciary (NOJ) and the opaque appointment process for judges to the Supreme Court (Kúria). The adoption of the Sovereignty Protection Act in 2023 has further heightened concerns, given its potential chilling effect on judicial independence and civil society engagement. In Poland, despite the change in government in 2023, key structural reforms undermining the rule of law — including the disciplinary regime for judges and the politicised functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal — had not been reversed or substantially reformed at the time of the 2025 report. In Slovakia, recent legislative proposals have raised alarms about the potential weakening of internal judicial governance structures and the increasing influence of the executive branch over the judiciary.

These cases illustrate that, while the broader trend across the Union is one of gradual reform, entrenched challenges persist and require sustained political will and institutional vigilance.

c. Key concerns raised by stakeholders

Throughout the country visits and consultations, stakeholders — including bar associations, judicial councils, and civil society actors — consistently flagged several recurring risks to judicial independence and the effective functioning of justice systems.

Chief among these were concerns about political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary procedures, which continue to undermine public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. A lack of transparency in the functioning and decision-making processes of judicial councils was also repeatedly identified as a structural weakness, limiting both accountability and trust. Stakeholders further reported threats to the internal independence of courts, such as opaque or arbitrary case allocation practices and undue hierarchical pressures on judges.

Finally, reprisals or smear campaigns targeting outspoken members of the judiciary were cited in several contexts, raising concerns about a broader climate of intimidation and self-censorship within the judicial profession. These recurring issues underscore the need for robust safeguards, greater transparency, and political restraint to preserve the independence and integrity of judicial institutions across the Union.

4- Anti-Corruption: A Legal and Cultural Challenge

Corruption undermines public trust, distorts economic development, and erodes the effectiveness of the justice system. It’s also a gateway to authoritarianism.

a. 1. Mixed progress across the Union

The 2025 Rule of Law Report shows uneven progress among Member States in strengthening their anti-corruption frameworks. While several countries have adopted concrete reforms, others continue to struggle with persistent shortcomings, particularly in enforcement and high-level political integrity.

France and Slovenia introduced new national anti-corruption strategies that include clear timelines, measurable targets, and accountability indicators, signalling a more strategic and structured approach. Portugal implemented institutional reforms by transferring the oversight of asset declarations to the newly operational Entidade para a Transparência (Transparency Entity) in 2023. Greece made substantial progress in improving the verification of asset declarations through a newly upgraded digital platform aimed at enhancing transparency and efficiency. Cyprus, meanwhile, introduced a specific internal regulatory framework for judges regarding asset disclosure, addressing a previously underregulated area.

Despite these advancements, enforcement remains a systemic weakness across several Member States. In Hungary, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the absence of effective mechanisms to verify asset declarations and the limited follow-up on allegations of political corruption were flagged as major concerns. Ireland has yet to significantly digitalise its asset declaration infrastructure, which continues to hinder transparency and proactive monitoring. Denmark, despite enjoying a high international perception of institutional integrity, has not made notable progress in addressing post-employment conflicts of interest or in establishing formal monitoring mechanisms for asset disclosures at the highest levels of the executive.

These disparities point to a broader pattern of reform asymmetry within the Union, where legislative or institutional advances are not always matched by effective implementation, rigorous oversight, or a comprehensive political commitment to integrity standards.

b. Legal frameworks vs. enforcement gaps

The report underlines a structural issue that persists across several Member States and candidate countries: while legal frameworks to combat corruption are often in place, implementation remains weak or inconsistent.

Investigations into high-level corruption cases are frequently slow, selective, or perceived as politically influenced, undermining their credibility and effectiveness. This persistent gap between formal compliance with EU recommendations and the practical enforcement of anti-corruption norms contributes to widespread public distrust in institutions. It highlights a key paradox: the existence of laws alone is insufficient if they are not backed by independent institutions, adequate resources, and political will.

This issue is particularly evident in candidate countries such as North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Although the legal architecture for regulating lobbying and asset declarations has been established in line with European standards, enforcement is virtually nonexistent. In practice, there are no registered lobbyists, minimal verification of asset declarations, and negligible follow-up on irregularities.

These shortcomings reveal a form of compliance that is more declarative than substantive, where legal alignment masks a lack of genuine institutional engagement.

As a result, the formal appearance of rule of law adherence often conceals deeper structural weaknesses in the fight against corruption and undue influence.

c. Whistleblower protection as a critical test

The EU Whistleblower Protection Directive2 (2019/1937) has prompted a wave of legislative reforms across Member States, aiming to establish common standards for safeguarding individuals who report breaches of EU law.

While the pace of transposition has accelerated since 2023, the Commission notes that practical protection remains uneven and often insufficient. Only a limited number of Member States have implemented independent and accessible reporting channels, and even fewer have established robust safeguards against retaliation. In many cases, legal provisions exist on paper but are not matched by operational mechanisms or adequate institutional support.

Public awareness also remains critically low. According to the 2024 Eurobarometer, only 43% of EU citizens know where or how to report corruption, and a mere 28% trust that the system will effectively protect whistleblowers from negative consequences.

These figures underscore the gap between formal legal frameworks and the lived experience of potential whistleblowers, whose willingness to come forward depends not only on legal guarantees but also on institutional trust, visibility of support structures, and cultural attitudes towards transparency.

The Commission continues to call for the establishment of genuinely independent bodies capable of receiving and investigating reports while shielding whistleblowers from reprisals.

d. Cultural and institutional inertia

The report stresses that fighting corruption is not just a technical or legal issue: it is a cultural and institutional challenge. In some countries, elite impunity, lack of investigative journalism capacity, and politicised enforcement bodies remain major obstacles.

The Commission also encourages greater transparency in political financing, open access to lobbying registers, and digitisation of administrative procedures to reduce discretionary power and corruption risks.

5- Media Freedom: An Area of Ongoing Concern

A free and independent press is essential to exposing corruption and maintaining public oversight. The European Media Freedom Act3 adopted in 2024 was aiming to ensure transparent media ownership, and prevent state-biased advertising

a. Persistent threats despite legislative progress

The Commission highlights that media freedom and pluralism remain under pressure in several Member States, despite a number of legal and institutional improvements. While some progress has been made in reinforcing the regulatory environment and enhancing transparency, the overall situation of journalists and the independence of media oversight bodies continue to raise serious concerns.

Among the positive developments, Croatia took steps to strengthen the independence of its audiovisual regulator, enhancing its structural and functional autonomy. Greece introduced new legislative safeguards aimed at protecting journalistic sources and improving access to public information, addressing long-standing gaps in legal protection. Portugal made notable progress in ensuring greater transparency of media ownership, contributing to a more open and accountable media landscape.

However, these improvements are offset by persistent and, in some cases, deepening risks. In Slovenia, Hungary, and Poland, political interference in public service media remains a significant concern, with recurring instances of government influence over appointments, editorial decisions, and institutional direction. In France and Germany, there has been a marked increase in incidents involving threats, harassment, and violence against journalists, particularly in the context of social unrest and protests, raising alarms about the deterioration of the working environment for media professionals even in long-established democracies. Meanwhile, in Bulgaria and Romania, systemic opacity in media financing continues to undermine the financial independence and editorial autonomy of press outlets, leaving them vulnerable to undue influence.

These ongoing issues underscore the fragility of media pluralism in the EU and point to the need for stronger enforcement mechanisms, independent oversight, and coordinated efforts to protect journalists and promote structural safeguards across all Member States.

b. Threats and attacks on journalists

The report expresses strong concern about the deteriorating safety environment for media professionals in several parts of the European Union.

Verbal harassment, online abuse, and even physical violence against journalists are on the rise, contributing to a climate of fear and self-censorship that undermines both press freedom and democratic accountability. Particularly troubling is the situation of investigative journalists reporting on corruption, organised crime, or politically sensitive issues, who often face targeted intimidation without adequate institutional support.

Despite the growing risks, several Member States still lack dedicated protection frameworks tailored to the specific vulnerabilities of media actors, leaving journalists exposed and without clear avenues for redress or security.

In response, the Commission reiterates its call for the full and timely implementation of the 2021 Recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists4, which sets out concrete measures for national authorities. It also underlines the importance of the European Media Freedom Act, which is expected to provide a stronger legal basis for safeguarding media independence, regulating state interference, and establishing robust protections for journalists across the Union.

c. Regulatory independence and economic pressure

The report underscores that media regulatory bodies across the EU are not always adequately protected from political or economic interference, posing a significant threat to media pluralism and editorial independence.

In countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, and Malta, the independence of media authorities remains structurally weak, with appointment procedures often lacking transparency and being subject to overt politicisation. This undermines the credibility and impartiality of regulatory oversight and erodes public trust in the institutions meant to safeguard media freedoms.

Compounding this issue is the continued use of state advertising and opaque public subsidies, which distort competition and create economically dependent media environments. This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in parts of Central and Eastern Europe, where government-linked advertising disproportionately benefits loyal outlets while marginalising critical or independent voices. The result is the entrenchment of clientelist ecosystems that reward political alignment over journalistic integrity, further weakening democratic discourse and the public’s access to diverse, reliable information.

The Commission calls for greater transparency in media financing, stricter safeguards for regulator autonomy, and structural reforms to ensure that economic levers are not used to manipulate the media space.

d. Public service media under pressure

The report reiterates persistent concerns over the condition of public service media in several Member States, where fundamental principles such as editorial independence and content pluralism remain under threat.

In particular, the editorial autonomy of public broadcasters continues to be compromised by political influence, with repeated instances of government pressure shaping newsroom leadership, programming decisions, and the framing of news coverage. A lack of pluralism in the representation of political and social issues further exacerbates the problem, limiting the diversity of viewpoints accessible to the public and undermining the role of public service media as a forum for democratic debate.

The instrumentalisation of public broadcasters for partisan purposes is especially evident in countries such as Hungary and, prior to the 2023 change of government, Poland, where state-run media have been systematically aligned with ruling party narratives. In Slovenia, similar concerns have been raised about the use of public service media to serve political agendas rather than the public interest. These developments underscore the need for clear legal guarantees of editorial independence, transparent governance structures, and effective mechanisms to protect public broadcasters from both direct political interference and indirect financial leverage.

e. Role of digital platforms and disinformation

The report stresses the urgent need for greater platform accountability in response to the growing threat posed by coordinated disinformation campaigns and the algorithmic amplification of extremist or harmful content. Digital platforms increasingly shape public discourse, yet they often lack transparent and consistent mechanisms for content moderation, allowing disinformation to spread rapidly and distort democratic debate.

The Commission highlights the particular risk of manipulation around electoral periods and on issues of high public sensitivity, such as migration, health policy, or foreign influence. In this context, the Digital Services Act (DSA) is expected to establish a more coherent and enforceable framework for regulating online platforms.

It aims to enhance transparency in content moderation practices, impose clear obligations on very large online platforms (VLOPs), and safeguard freedom of expression by ensuring that restrictions on content are proportionate, non-discriminatory, and subject to effective redress. The DSA also introduces new oversight mechanisms, including audits and risk assessments, to hold platforms accountable for the systemic impact of their algorithms and moderation policies on the public sphere.

6- Other Institutional Issues Related to Checks and Balances

The fourth pillar of the Rule of Law Report evaluates how power is balanced and contested across institutional frameworks within each Member State. It focuses on the resilience of democratic institutions, particularly in their capacity to resist executive overreach and uphold participatory governance.

a. Legislative Process

The report devotes particular attention to the functioning of legislative processes as a key component of institutional checks and balances.

It assesses transparency in the drafting of laws, the accessibility of legislative texts to the public, the quality and consistency of regulatory impact assessments, and the extent to which parliamentary debate allows for meaningful scrutiny.

Several Member States were specifically urged to improve public access to information, enhance stakeholder consultation, and ensure proper parliamentary oversight, especially in contexts involving emergency legislation or the use of accelerated legislative procedures. The Commission warns that frequent reliance on fast-tracked processes, without adequate justification or deliberation, risks weakening democratic legitimacy and marginalising both opposition voices and civil society input.

Ensuring that lawmaking is transparent, participatory, and based on clear evidence is essential not only for upholding the rule of law but also for fostering public trust in institutions and legislative outcomes.

b. Role of Constitutional Courts or Equivalent Bodies

The report highlights the role played by constitutional courts or equivalent bodies in safeguarding the constitutionality of laws and upholding the separation of powers within democratic systems. It focuses on the composition, independence, and institutional effectiveness of these high courts, which serve as essential guarantors of legal certainty and fundamental rights.

The Commission notes with concern that in some Member States, risks of politicisation persist in the appointment procedures for constitutional judges, often lacking transparency or dominated by governing majorities. In certain cases, attempts have been made to weaken or bypass the authority of constitutional bodies, either through legislative amendments aimed at curbing their jurisdiction or through the appointment of loyalists to dilute their oversight functions.

Such practices threaten to undermine the checks and balances necessary for a functioning rule of law and may erode the capacity of constitutional courts to act as impartial arbiters of legality.

The Commission calls for stronger safeguards to ensure judicial independence, depoliticised nomination processes, and the institutional resilience of constitutional jurisdictions across the Union.

c. Balance Between Powers

The report offers a detailed analysis of the balance of powers within Member States, examining the interactions between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.

Particular attention is given to the use of executive decrees, the invocation and duration of emergency powers, and the existence and effectiveness of judicial review mechanisms. The Commission expresses concern in cases where the executive exercises disproportionate influence over legislative processes, often sidelining parliamentary debate or bypassing scrutiny through accelerated procedures and decree powers.

In several Member States, the continued or repeated use of emergency powers, sometimes without adequate legal safeguards or sunset clausesn, has raised questions about institutional overreach and the erosion of democratic oversight. Furthermore, in systems where judicial review mechanisms are weak, obstructed, or politically captured, the capacity of courts to provide meaningful checks on executive authority is significantly diminished.

d. Functioning of Independent Authorities

The report underscores the essential role of independent authorities in upholding democratic standards and ensuring institutional accountability within Member States.

This category includes ombudspersons, anti-corruption agencies, data protection authorities, supreme audit institutions, and electoral commissions — all of which are tasked with monitoring state conduct and protecting citizens’ rights.

The Commission assesses these bodies along three main dimensions: their institutional independence, their financial and budgetary autonomy, and their operational capacity to carry out mandates effectively.

While many Member States maintain a formal framework guaranteeing the autonomy of such institutions, the report identifies growing concerns in several countries regarding attempts to curtail their mandates, restrict their resources, or interfere with their leadership appointments. Moreover, even when these authorities issue recommendations or rulings, obstacles to enforcement often persist — ranging from political inaction to procedural delays — thereby weakening their deterrent effect.

The Commission calls for reinforced guarantees of independence, adequate funding, and stronger mechanisms to ensure the binding nature or practical impact of decisions issued by these oversight bodies, which remain a cornerstone of the broader rule of law ecosystem.

e. Civic Space

The report devotes particular attention to the state of civic space across the Union, recognising it as a vital component of democratic life and a key indicator of respect for fundamental rights.

The Commission monitors the legal and political conditions affecting the freedom of association, the operating environment of non-governmental organisations, and the right to peaceful assembly. It flags with concern the increasing use of restrictive measures that signal a shrinking civic space in certain Member States.

These include the adoption or consideration of so-called “foreign agent” laws aimed at delegitimising civil society organisations with international funding, as well as burdensome reporting requirements that disproportionately target advocacy groups. In addition, the report documents cases of administrative harassment, including selective audits, delays in registration, and sudden revocation of legal status. Smear campaigns and public discrediting of civil society actors by political figures or state-aligned media further contribute to a climate of intimidation.

The Commission stresses that an open, pluralistic civic space, where NGOs can operate freely and without fear, is essential to a resilient democracy and must be protected against both legal and informal forms of suppression.

7- Civil society

The 2025 Rule of Law Report notes an increase in state-led pressures against watchdog organisations and independent media, with legislative tools increasingly used to intimidate civil society actors.

So-called Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are increasingly employed to silence journalists and activists. While awareness of these practices is growing across the Union, substantial progress is still needed to counter them effectively. The adoption of the EU’s Directive 2024/10695 is a promising step in establishing common minimum standards, but its real-world effectiveness remains to be seen as implementation is still in its early phase.

The report draws particular attention to the instrumentalisation of legal frameworks as a means of intimidation — a phenomenon often referred to as “lawfare” or strategic legal harassment. This practice consists in using the law to exert pressure on journalists, NGOs, or political opponents, not to ensure justice, but to exhaust, stigmatise, or silence them.

One major manifestation of this phenomenon is the proliferation of abusive lawsuits. Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) continue to be used in a number of Member States to suppress critical voices, particularly those of journalists and civil society organisations. These lawsuits are typically initiated by powerful business or political actors not with the intention of securing judicial redress, but to impose financial, legal, and psychological burdens on their targets.

The anti-SLAPP directive adopted in 2024 aims to provide a harmonised legal shield for public watchdogs against such abusive litigation. However, its effectiveness depends on national transposition and the degree to which judicial cultures embrace its protective logic.

The report also documents mounting legal pressure on NGOs and independent institutions. In Hungary, the 2023 “Act on National Sovereignty Protection” created a Sovereignty Protection Office endowed with sweeping investigatory powers aimed at NGOs and media suspected of receiving foreign funding, a mechanism widely criticised as a tool for stigmatisation and intimidation.

Although not an EU Member State, Georgia is cited in the report for its adoption of a “foreign influence” law strongly resembling Russian-style “foreign agent” legislation, which the Commission views as part of a wider regional trend. The Venice Commission has echoed this concern. Meanwhile, in Slovakia and Romania, recent amendments to laws governing civil society associations raise concerns about overregulation and the potential chilling effects these legal frameworks may have on civic activism and NGO operations.

The report also highlights the chilling effect produced by disproportionate legal or administrative measures. In France, concerns were raised about the use of police and administrative powers to limit the right to protest under broadly defined public order justifications. In Poland, prior to the political change in 2023, multiple cases were reported in which judges faced disciplinary action based on their public speech or judicial decisions — cases that are now undergoing reassessment. In Italy, newly proposed legislation on defamation and media liability has sparked debate about its potential impact on freedom of expression, with critics warning that vague or overly punitive provisions could deter investigative journalism.

Faced with these developments, the Commission calls for stronger institutional safeguards to prevent the weaponisation of legal instruments. It stresses the responsibility of Member States to preserve the independence and resilience of their judicial and constitutional systems. In particular, the role of constitutional courts, ombudspersons, and independent regulatory authorities is emphasised as essential in acting as buffers against abuse, capable of upholding the rule of law when democratic checks come under pressure.

8- Challenging the CJEU and the Commission: Between Political Criticism and Legal Disobedience

In recent years, several Member States have expressed growing resistance to the expanding role played by the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in defining and interpreting the rule of law. This phenomenon reflects increasing tensions between supranational legal authority and national constitutional sovereignty, with the EU’s normative power coming under intensified scrutiny.

a. Rejection of the Primacy of EU Law

National court decisions have openly challenged the authority of the CJEU. In October 2021, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal ruled that certain provisions of the Treaty on European Union were incompatible with the Polish Constitution, thereby contesting the primacy of EU law in the K 3/21 case. In May 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) held that the CJEU’s Weiss ruling on the European Central Bank’s monetary policy was ultra vires, beyond the Court’s competence, marking a rare case of legal disobedience by a founding Member State. These developments illustrate a growing pushback against supranational judicial control, especially when it is perceived as encroaching on core sovereign prerogatives such as justice, budgetary authority, constitutional structure, or national security.

b. Political Criticism of the Rule of Law Report

Alongside legal challenges, several governments have voiced political opposition to the Commission’s Rule of Law Report. Hungary has repeatedly accused the Commission of applying ideological and legally vague standards without a clear basis in the Treaties. In 2024, the Slovak government under Robert Fico expressed its rejection of any budgetary conditionality based on what it described as “subjective” and “politicised” assessments. Romania and Bulgaria, for their part, have previously criticised the Commission for what they perceive as unequal treatment between Eastern and Western Member States, particularly regarding corruption and media pluralism.

c. An Implicit Expansion of the Commission’s Mandate?

Some Member States see in the Commission’s evolving role a form of implicit competence creep. By positioning itself as the guardian of the democratic quality of national regimes, the Commission appears to go beyond its original mandate of monitoring compliance with EU law. It increasingly acts as a quasi-constitutional authority, assessing the structural integrity of national political systems without a firm legal basis in the Treaties for doing so. Through its recommendations—which are increasingly tied to EU funding, especially since the adoption of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism (Regulation 2020/2092), the Commission exercises a de facto normative power. Yet this power lacks direct democratic accountability or legal clarity. Several governments have denounced this shift as an encroachment on their constitutional sovereignty, particularly in areas like the judiciary and media regulation, which remain core national competences under the current Treaties.

d. Towards a Fragmentation of the European Consensus

This wave of contestation is not an isolated phenomenon; it reflects a deeper political divide over the role and nature of the European Union itself. On one side are Member States that advocate for a deepening of European integration based on normative foundations : rule of law, shared values, and democratic standards. On the other side are those that uphold a more intergovernmental vision of the Union, rooted in the primacy of national sovereignty and voluntary cooperation between independent states.

The 2025 Rule of Law Report, while emphasising the importance of dialogue and cooperation, finds itself increasingly caught in this widening tension.

It is used as a supervisory tool to monitor democratic standards across the Union, yet it lacks judicial status and is not always recognised as a legitimate instrument by all Member States. As a result, the report operates in a contested political space, where its authority is both invoked and rejected, reflecting the growing fragmentation of the European consensus on the balance between integration and sovereignty.

9- Future Directions: Deepening and Expanding the Rule of Law Framework

In its 2024 Rule of Law Report, the European Commission outlines a strategic vision for the evolution of its monitoring framework, reflecting both institutional maturity and political ambition. These future directions are designed to consolidate a lasting culture of the rule of law across the Union and to enhance the tool’s impact well beyond the scope of annual reporting.

Reinforced link with EU funding
A key development is the reinforced link between rule of law assessments and EU financial instruments. The implementation of the Commission’s recommendations may increasingly determine access to EU funding, especially in the context of the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). This approach includes positive incentives, such as targeted financial support for Member States investing in judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, or the independence of the media. Conversely, Member States exhibiting systemic deficiencies may be subject to funding restrictions in line with the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation (Regulation 2020/2092). This dual-track logic aims to embed respect for the rule of law more directly into the EU’s budgetary governance.

Enhanced tracking of implementation
The Commission also intends to enhance the tracking of implementation through a more structured and rigorous follow-up mechanism. This will allow for better monitoring of national reforms and legislative outcomes in response to previous recommendations. The move comes in response to earlier criticisms regarding the limited consequences of non-compliance and aims to increase accountability while strengthening the credibility of the entire process.

Thematic expansion: integration of the Single Market perspective
Another major innovation announced in the 2025 report is the thematic expansion of the framework to integrate the perspective of the Single Market. For the first time, rule of law considerations will explicitly include their effects on businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating across borders. This reflects a growing recognition that dysfunctions in judicial systems, legal uncertainty, or lack of media transparency can directly harm the functioning of the internal market. In this vision, the rule of law is no longer viewed solely as a constitutional or democratic principle, but also as a fundamental condition for economic cohesion, cross-border trust, and legal predictability.

Progressive inclusion of enlargement countries
The Commission further confirms the progressive inclusion of enlargement countries into the rule of law monitoring cycle. This extension supports the logic of pre-accession conditionality and seeks to establish a common culture of rule of law assessment both within and beyond the EU. It also aligns with broader geopolitical objectives by promoting the EU acquis in neighbouring regions, especially the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries.

Strengthening the legitimacy and transparency of the tool
Finally, the Commission reaffirms its commitment to strengthening the legitimacy and transparency of the rule of law tool. This includes ensuring equal treatment of all Member States to avoid perceptions of double standards; maintaining an evidence-based methodology rooted in stakeholder consultations, judicial decisions, and data from international organisations such as the Venice Commission, the OECD, and the Council of Europe; and preserving a fundamentally dialogical process, rather than a coercive one, in order to foster trust and promote ownership of reforms at the national level. The overarching goal is to reinforce the rule of law as a shared, operational, and unifying value across the Union and its future members.

10- Conclusion: A United Europe Built on Rule of Law

Europe’s greatest achievements, open internal borders, economic cooperation, shared prosperity, depend on legal reliability, mutual trust, and democratic accountability. The rule of law and journalistic freedom are among Europe’s most precious accomplishments, rooted in Roman law and Enlightenment ideals.

The Rule of Law: Foundations, Challenges, and the Need for Renewed Legitimacy

The rule of law is not a flexible policy choice. It is the foundational principle that guarantees freedom, equality, and justice within the European Union. It is what allows citizens to trust their institutions, governments to respect their obligations, and Member States to cooperate on the basis of law rather than force or influence.

Yet the increasing reluctance of some Member States to fully accept rule of law mechanisms reveals a growing gap of legitimacy. This is not a reason to weaken our standards. On the contrary, it is a call to strengthen their legitimacy. Ultimately, the future of the European Union depends on our capacity to defend the rule of law not only as a legal obligation, but as a shared commitment to the integrity of our democracies.

But the way it is safeguarded raises complex questions. Beyond the principle, the challenge lies in the modalities of control over Member States’ democratic standards. Today, the Commission’s approach combines annual monitoring, recommendations, and, in extreme cases, budgetary conditionality or legal action. This model has the merit of being systematic, transparent, and based on dialogue.

The current approach rests on four complementary pillars: evaluation—based on common criteria, with clearer explanation of benchmarks, sources, and country-specific nuances; accompaniment—through technical support, institutional twinning, and peer review mechanisms that foster shared learning rather than confrontation; reform incentives—including targeted EU funding to support structural improvements in rule of law infrastructure; proportional sanctions—to be used only as a last resort, with procedural safeguards to avoid politicisation or arbitrariness. Such an architecture helps consolidate Member States’ trust in the rule of law framework and prevent further fragmentation.

However, our responsibility as political actors and commentators goes further. We must also question the deeper causes of the erosion of rule of law legitimacy in some parts of Europe. This is not only a legal or institutional issue : it is a matter of political anthropology.

Understanding the conditions under which the rule of law remains accepted, internalised, and effective requires a broader reflection on legitimacy itself. Re-legitimising the European legal order implies addressing not just the mechanisms of enforcement, but also the narratives, expectations, and power structures that shape democratic life across the Union.

Reclaiming the Historical Foundations of the Rule of Law

To restore the legitimacy of the rule of law in Europe, we must return to its historical roots, not merely as a legal norm, but as a political and moral ideal shaped by centuries of resistance to arbitrary power.

The rule of law emerged as a response to executive absolutism, first in the modern age: during the English Revolution, when Parliament sought to bind the crown by law; and in the French Revolution, where popular sovereignty was claimed against royal privilege and inherited inequality. Later, in the twentieth century, the rule of law was reaffirmed in the aftermath of totalitarian regimes, as a means of ensuring that no government could place itself above justice, rights, or public reason.

At the heart of this legacy lies a specific political anthropology: the idea of the citizen as a free and rational individual, capable of self-government and deserving of institutions that serve, rather than dominate, the public. This Enlightenment-inspired vision rejects arbitrariness, obscurantism, and corruption. It also rejects relativism.

The rule of law is not a floating standard, adaptable to political convenience. It is rooted in a vision of justice based on accountability, transparency, and the equality of all before the law.

What is ultimately at stake is not only the functioning of courts or the balance of powers. It is the kind of civilisation we want to inhabit: one where public authority is exercised with scruple, where institutions answer to the people, and where freedom is safeguarded by reason, not subjected to force or manipulated by ideology.

This is the intellectual and political heritage that must guide our efforts to rebuild a legitimate European rule of law: not as technocratic conditionality, but as the shared moral architecture of a just and democratic polity.