The agenda of the June 2025 plenary session of the European Parliament reflects the sheer breadth and diversity of both legislative formats and policy themes under discussion.
From recast directives on child protection and bilateral agreements on timber trade to enlargement assessments, energy reform, and ethics oversight, the session spans complex, interlinked domains of EU governance. The schedule includes consent procedures, implementation reports, and key debates—each engaging different committees, political groups, and rapporteurs.
Whether addressing the EU–Ukraine freight agreement, the future of the Energy Charter Treaty, debating the Clean Industrial Deal, or anchoring Ukraine into Europe’s free circulation, the Parliament navigates issues of law, partnerships, enlargement, economy, and sustainability. Ave Europa lays out its structured, principled positions on these varied items, underscoring the need for consistency and ambition in Europe’s legislative and political response.
🗓️ I – Tuesday, 17 June 2025
- Child Protection
LIBE – Lenaers / Brunner
🗂️ COD – First Reading
📄 Combating the sexual abuse and exploitation of children (recast)
The recast of Directive 2011/93/EU emerges from a context of rapid technological change and growing legal fragmentation across Member States in addressing child sexual abuse, prompting the Commission to propose a comprehensive revision aimed at strengthening criminalisation, improving victim support, and enhancing cross-border cooperation. Juridically, the proposal expands the scope of offences to include synthetic images, deepfakes, and virtual abuse, and introduces a crucial semantic shift by replacing the term “child pornography” with “child sexual abuse material,” thereby affirming the abusive and criminal nature of all such depictions. Ave Europa supports this reform, as it reflects a necessary adaptation of the law to the new ontology of the image in the digital age. In particular, we welcome the abandonment of misleading euphemisms and the reaffirmation that any visual or representational abuse of a non-consenting person—especially a child—must be treated with the utmost legal severity.
- Transport and External Relations
TRAN – Droese
🗂️ NLE – Consent
📄 EU–Ukraine road freight agreement (amendment)
The 2024 amending agreement to the EU–Ukraine road freight deal, concluded under the consent procedure (Article 218(6) TFEU), comes amid both geopolitical urgency and domestic tensions. While the Commission and Council proposed to prolong the 2022 agreement—with limited amendments and tacit renewal—the ENF rapporteur from the ESN group opposed its conclusion, citing concerns over security, market distortion, and regulatory asymmetry. His report recommended withholding parliamentary consent.
Legally, the agreement remains an autonomous international instrument, closely tied to the broader EU–Ukraine Association framework. It liberalises freight transport by removing permit obligations, mutualising document recognition, and establishing joint implementation mechanisms. The 2024 amendment includes technical adjustments to improve enforcement, clarify jurisdictional limits, and ensure flexibility through the Joint Committee.
In this context, Ave Europa would not have voted against the agreement. While sharing some concerns over monitoring and local impact, we believe rejecting the renewal would have sent a politically incoherent and strategically counterproductive signal. Instead, we support the cross-party amendment submitted by groups across the spectrum—from The Left to ECR—restoring consent and allowing the agreement to proceed with reinforced safeguards.
- International Trade – Agreements with Cameroon
INTA – Karlsbro
🗂️ NLE – Consent
📄 Termination of the EU–Cameroon FLEGT timber agreement
📄 Termination of the VPA with Cameroon (duplicate legal basis)
The termination of the FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with Cameroon marks the end of a legal framework adopted in 2010 to combat illegal logging through timber traceability, licensing, and stakeholder dialogue. Under Article 218(6) TFEU, the decision to withdraw required Parliament’s consent, following a joint assessment by the Commission and the Cameroonian government that the objectives of the VPA could no longer be met under current conditions. The Council proposed formal termination, and Parliament was invited to approve the withdrawal.
The end of the agreement reflects a sober recognition of persistent governance failures, weak law enforcement, and limited progress in achieving full FLEGT licensing. Despite technical cooperation, the agreement failed to secure systemic reforms or to overcome entrenched structural challenges in the Cameroonian forestry sector. Its termination opens space for a more flexible, targeted, and geopolitically aligned strategy, notably through the Global Gateway initiative and bilateral engagement.
Ave Europa would have voted in favour of ending the agreement. We welcome the Union’s capacity to reassess its own instruments and acknowledge their limitations. We commend the other third-countries that maintained high due diligence standards and remained engaged beyond the VPA. We also support the orientation toward Global Gateway as a more agile and geopolitical framework for partnership. Looking forward, we hope that the EU’s normative power will not only promote responsible value chains but also contribute to strengthening governance and institutional accountability in third countries such as Cameroon.
- EU Enlargement
AFET – Šarec / Marta Kos
🗂️ INI – Annual Report
📄 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro
AFET – Mikser / Marta Kos
🗂️ INI – Annual Report
📄 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova
The 2025 annual reports on Montenegro and Moldova, adopted under the non-legislative initiative procedure, reflect the structural contradictions of the EU’s enlargement framework. Moldova, despite its structural fragilities, has entered accession negotiations with clear political momentum, while Montenegro—candidate since 2010, with all chapters opened—remains trapped in a cycle of technical compliance and political inertia. Both countries have met key obligations under the Copenhagen criteria, particularly in Chapters 23 and 24, yet continue to suffer from institutional instability and foreign interference, which EU instruments only partially address.
In both Moldova and Montenegro, the Commission underlines that judicial independence remains incomplete, with magistrate appointments and disciplinary bodies still exposed to political interference. Legislative instability persists, as key legal frameworks—particularly on elections and anti-corruption—are frequently amended without sufficient public consultation or institutional continuity. Both reports also emphasise the limited operational capacity of state institutions to counter hybrid threats, as neither country has established a fully autonomous and resilient framework for preventing foreign influence, disinformation, or undue pressure on the media and judiciary.
Ave Europa supports enlargement as a strategic priority and a constitutional mission of the Union (Article 49 TEU). We support enlargement as a strategic necessity, not merely a bureaucratic ritual. We welcome the Parliament’s emphasis on reform credibility, foreign interference, and institutional resilience. However, we also call for a reform of the enlargement methodology to restore legitimacy and strategic coherence. The Union must ensure that genuine progress is rewarded swiftly and tangibly. We also call for robust EU technical assistance focused on anti-corruption enforcement, judicial vetting, and public procurement integrity.
But we deplore the slowness, complexity, and asymmetry of the current methodology. The case of Montenegro illustrates the erosion of credibility when sustained efforts are met with institutional fatigue. Moldova cannot become another “promised land” locked in pre-accession limbo.
Both illustrate that without credible timelines, political engagement and real technical support, the promise of accession risks becoming a source of destabilisation rather than integration. Europe must not abandon Montenegro to stagnation, nor Moldova to disappointed hopes of integration that will exhaust its population and leave an open space for Russia.
We call for a renewed framework that allows for a debate on the conditions of integration with a view to accelerating the process without undermining the quality and credibility of accession. We also support increased EU presence on the ground to better accompany institutional alignment and administrative capacity-building. Enlargement must become a vector of stability—not a bureaucratic endurance test. Europe cannot afford a strategy where time works against it.
🗓️ II – Wednesday, 18 June 2025
- Preparation for the European Council
Plenary – Von der Leyen
🗂️ RSP – Key Debate
📄 Preparation of the European Council of 26–27 June 2025
The European Council of 26–27 June 2025 comes at a pivotal moment for the European Union, at the intersection of immediate strategic challenges (the war in Ukraine, tensions in the Middle East), decisive internal reforms (competitiveness, democracy, defence), and upcoming political transitions. In accordance with Article 3(1) of its Rules of Procedure, the annotated draft agenda was presented by the President of the European Council in close coordination with the rotating Polish Presidency and the European Commission. It will serve as the basis for political decisions that will shape the legislative semester and prepare broader orientations through to 2026. This Council also marks the final formal sequence led by the Polish Presidency before the handover to Denmark on 1 July.
The Council’s agenda is structured around six main priorities: military and political support to Ukraine, tensions in the Middle East, strengthening European defence capacities (via the SAFE programme), revising competitiveness mechanisms (notably through the CBAM), democratic resilience, and institutional governance.
At the legal and institutional level, several cross-cutting elements deserve attention:
– The endorsement of the 2025 European Semester country-specific recommendations.
– The continued monitoring of procedures under Article 7, particularly with regard to Hungary.
– The political endorsement of the SAFE programme as the first federal budgetary pillar for European defence.
– The affirmation of an explicit link between internal democratic resilience and external strategic coherence, notably through the proposed “European Shield for Democracy.” (EUDS)
Additional sensitive matters are also under discussion or maturing: the status of regional languages (Catalan, Basque, Galician), the budgetary situation of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, climate standards in the automotive sector, and simplification of the CBAM to the benefit of SMEs. These discussions form part of a broader process of political integration that links crisis response, structural transformation, and institutional stabilisation.
Ave Europa welcomes the ambitious content of this European Council and salutes the strategic coherence that underpins its agenda. We commend the Polish Presidency for its work in setting out a clear programme centered on security, competitiveness, and democratic resilience, with a sense of political clarity and institutional continuity. We place high expectations in the upcoming Danish Presidency, given its traditional commitment to effective decision-making and democratic principles.
We reiterate that reforming the functioning of the Council remains, for Ave Europa, a top priority in the next phase of integration. This reform must both enhance the Union’s decision-making capacity — through greater recourse to qualified majority voting, notably in foreign policy and taxation — and democratise the Council itself: when national governments are backed by clear parliamentary majorities, they should be able to address the Commission directly as a counterweight or initiator. This would be a meaningful step toward a federal Union where national democratic legitimacy and European sovereignty are mutually reinforcing.
- AOB – Institutional and Legal Affairs
INTA / ITRE – Cavazzini, Budka
🗂️ COD – First Reading
📄 Energy Charter Treaty interpretation agreement
The draft decision 2024/0148(COD) aims to have the European Union adopt an interinstitutional agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), in a context of legal rupture between the Treaty and EU law. The Commission justifies this initiative as a necessary response to the Komstroy judgment (CJEU, C-741/19), which ruled that Article 26(2)(c) ECT—relating to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)—does not apply to intra-EU disputes. Despite this, arbitral tribunals continue to assume jurisdiction, issuing awards incompatible with Articles 267 and 344 TFEU.
The agreement, negotiated by the Commission, Euratom and the Member States and initialled on 26 June 2024, seeks to end this legal uncertainty by affirming that the ECT has never applied, does not apply and will never apply to intra-EU relations. It follows the EU’s formal withdrawal from the ECT, notified on 27 June 2024, in the wake of several Member States (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, etc.) having denounced the Treaty as incompatible with EU climate objectives. The European Economic and Social Committee supports the initiative, reiterating its criticism of ISDS as a threat to sovereignty, transparency, and the energy transition, and pointing out that around 70% of arbitration cases under the ECT concern intra-EU disputes.
Legally, the decision is based on Article 194 TFEU on energy policy. It confirms that the inter se agreement constitutes an international law instrument that imposes a shared interpretation among the EU, Euratom and the Member States, aimed at pre-empting attempts to circumvent EU law through international arbitration. The parliamentary decision (report A10-0009/2025) endorses this approach without substantive amendments, under a simplified procedure.
The agreement introduces no new provisions: it reiterates the inapplicability of Article 26 ECT to intra-EU disputes and aims to neutralise the Treaty’s 20-year survival clause (Article 47), which would otherwise allow investors to bring claims for two decades after withdrawal. The Commission’s objective is to shield Member States from litigation risks associated with past investments in fossil fuels while aligning arbitral practice with CJEU case law. The external dimension is also crucial: many arbitral awards are enforced in third countries by law firms disregarding the Court’s position, creating a latent conflict between legal orders. The agreement thus aims to confront non-EU tribunals with a binding interpretative standard among contracting parties, to stem this divergent jurisprudence.
Ave Europa fully supports the primacy of Union law over private arbitration mechanisms and welcomes the reaffirmation by the Council and the Commission of the clear legal interpretation established by the Court of Justice in the Komstroy ruling. This reading, consistent with EU primary law and now enshrined in a binding agreement among the EU, Euratom and Member States, strengthens the legal certainty of Member States by explicitly excluding any ISDS application to intra-EU relations. Ave Europa therefore calls for this legal clarification to serve as a starting point for a broader overhaul of the Union’s external energy relations.
- AFCO – Simon
🗂️ CNS – Reconsultation
📄 Electoral rights of mobile EU citizens
The Directive on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European Parliament elections for mobile Union citizens (2021/0372(CNS)) is currently undergoing recast. It aims to ensure the full exercise of voting and candidacy rights for EU citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals. As part of the revision process initiated in December 2021, the European Commission proposed the harmonisation of administrative procedures (registration, information provision, deadlines) to reduce the persistent obstacles to electoral participation faced by mobile EU citizens. The report adopted by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO), based on this proposal, incorporates several key demands expressed by Parliament as early as 2022—particularly in terms of accessibility, transparency of electoral rolls, respect for deadlines, and the guarantee that information be provided in a language citizens can understand.
From a legal standpoint, the text is based on Article 22(2) of the TFEU and follows the consultation procedure. It does not seek to fully harmonise electoral law, but rather introduces a procedural directive aimed at ensuring fair treatment for non-national EU citizens residing in another Member State. Its scope is narrowly defined, but it raises important questions about the interface with national electoral frameworks, especially in Member States where voter registration is not automatic. Politically, the directive enjoys relative consensus but also reveals a deep divide: liberal groups advocate for full electoral equality across borders, while more sovereigntist formations seek to preserve the connection between citizenship and nationality.
The political implications of the text are twofold. On the one hand, it reflects a desire to make EU citizenship tangible by reinforcing cross-border democratic participation. On the other, it highlights the structural limitations of EU secondary law in electoral matters, since implementation remains highly dependent on national administrations. In its opinion of 26 October 2022—reaffirmed via a letter dated 20 March 2025—the LIBE Committee emphasised the need for fair access to information in a comprehensible language, simplification of registration procedures, and effective procedural safeguards. The LIBE Committee acknowledged improvements made in the Council’s amended text but maintained that the core of its previous opinion remained fully valid. It therefore invited the AFCO Committee to take into account its unchanged recommendations, in the spirit of parliamentary continuity.
Among the most structured contributions to this file were those tabled by the Patriots for Europe group, which expressed a principled opposition to what they perceive as the directive’s implicit direction. According to this group, the proposal paves the way toward the creation of a common European electoral constituency, a gradual alignment of national electoral codes, and ultimately, transnational electoral lists—a political shift they consider illegitimate without explicit popular consent.
Several amendments from MEP Jean-Paul Garraud made this clear. One explicitly states: “The purpose of this directive is not to establish a common European electoral constituency or to support the establishment of transnational lists… Any change in that direction would be a major political decision and would need to be expressly endorsed by the people.” In addition, numerous semantic substitutions were proposed to replace terms such as “Union citizen” or “Union voter” with “Member State citizen” or “Member State voter,” thereby reasserting the primacy of national frameworks. A central amendment also reiterated that: “Member States shall ensure, within the framework of their existing administrative structures…”—affirming a sovereigntist reading of the directive, respectful of national electoral systems.
Ave Europa group fully supports any initiative aimed at simplifying access to fundamental democratic rights, particularly for mobile European citizens. We would therefore have voted in favour of this directive, which strengthens the effectiveness of Union citizenship. The concerns expressed by the Patriots for Europe group—regarding a supposed drift toward the creation of a common EU electorate or transnational lists—illustrate a fundamental political divergence. For Ave Europa, EU citizens constitute a single constituent people, endowed with shared rights that must be exercised across national borders. Far from being a threat, we view this development as a democratic necessity. This is why our political project embraces a fully pan-European and transnational logic, breaking with any purely state-centred interpretation of electoral sovereignty.
- AFCO – Simon
🗂️ REG – Rules of Procedure Amendment
📄 Declaration of input – Annex I, Article 8
📄 Implementation of the Ethics Body agreement
The draft report (2025/2044(REG)) by Sven Simon, Rapporteur for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO), concerns the implementation of the interinstitutional Agreement establishing the Ethics Body through amendments to the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. This follows the President’s letter of 14 May 2024 and aims to integrate the operational and procedural provisions necessary to ensure the Parliament’s compliance with the Agreement. The procedure is governed by Rules 242 and 243 of the Rules of Procedure and follows the standard procedure for internal institutional regulation.
Amendment 1 introduces a new Title (Title XA) in the Rules of Procedure, formally creating a dedicated section for provisions related to the Ethics Body.
Amendment 2 inserts Rule 239a, detailing the appointment process for Parliament’s representative and alternate representative to the Ethics Body. The appointees must be Vice-Presidents, nominated by the Conference of Presidents and appointed by the President, with renewable terms of two and a half years. Gender balance is to be considered.
Amendment 3 (Rule 239b) provides for conflict of interest situations: if both the representative and alternate are compromised, a temporary alternate shall be appointed by the President, upon a proposal by the Conference of Presidents.
Amendment 4 (Rule 239c) empowers the AFCO committee to set the Parliament’s mandate to be represented in the Ethics Body. If contested by a group or a sufficient number of MEPs, it is submitted to a plenary vote. The representative must report annually (or upon request) to the committee.
Amendment 5 (Rule 239d) enables the AFCO committee to propose candidates for the role of independent experts in the Ethics Body, in line with Article 5(2) of the Agreement.
Amendment 6 (Rule 239e) allows the committee to request abstract interpretations of ethical standards via the representative. Such interpretations, once provided, must be published on the Parliament’s website.
Amendment 7 (Rule 239f) defines procedures for consulting the independent experts. Both the AFCO committee (for general standards) and the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members (for specific cases) may submit questions. The resulting opinions are confidential and non-binding.
Amendment 8 (Rule 239g) mandates a written self-assessment of Parliament’s ethical rules and their compliance with the common standards. The AFCO committee shall report this assessment to the full Parliament.
Amendment 9 (Rule 239h) assigns AFCO the task of examining the Ethics Body’s annual report and, if necessary, submitting a resolution for parliamentary response.
This package of amendments ensures institutional alignment with the Ethics Body Agreement, enhances procedural clarity, and reinforces parliamentary oversight mechanisms.
The Amendments proposed by Daniel Freund (Greens/EFA) to the draft report 2025/2044(REG) by Sven Simon significantly reinforce and differentiate the framework initially adopted by the AFCO committee. Amendment 10 introduces more stringent selection criteria for the independent experts of the Ethics Body.
Amendment 11 broadens the ability to request abstract interpretations of common ethical standards. In the original text, this right was limited to the competent committee; Freund’s version extends it to include the President and the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members (ACCM), ensuring broader institutional participation. It also mandates the publication of these interpretations on the Parliament’s website, strengthening transparency and public oversight.
Amendment 12 enhances the consultation process with the independent experts. While the Simon report allows confidential and non-binding written opinions, requested solely by the committee or the ACCM, Freund expands this to the President as well, distinguishing between general ethical standard-setting and specific case inquiries. Most importantly, it introduces a duty to publish the experts’ written responses alongside the Parliament’s subsequent decisions and requires justification if the advice is not followed—marking a decisive shift towards traceability and accountability.
Amendment 13 redefines how the annual report of the Ethics Body is handled. Whereas the Simon text allows the committee to examine the report and potentially propose a resolution, Freund’s version empowers the committee to propose amendments to the Rules of Procedure based on the report’s findings.
This change aligns the Ethics Body’s annual report with the treatment of other oversight bodies like the European Ombudsman and gives it a stronger normative impact. Overall, the amendments tabled by Daniel Freund reflect a more demanding, transparent, and democratically inclusive approach. They introduce stricter safeguards for expert selection, open up interpretative and consultative processes to more institutional actors, ensure public access to ethical evaluations, and enhance the capacity of Parliament to adapt its internal rules in light of ethical oversight.
Conclusion – Position of Ave Europa
Ave Europa fully supports the strengthening of public ethics and the rehabilitation of public values within the institutions of the European Union. In light of recent corruption scandals—particularly the Qatargate affair—we consider it essential to consolidate the integrity and credibility of the Union’s democratic processes.
Ethics bodies play a central role in this effort. They must not be symbolic or merely procedural, but genuinely independent and equipped with the tools necessary to carry out effective oversight.
In this regard, we would have supported the amendments tabled by the Greens/EFA Group, which go beyond the original text by reinforcing the independence, transparency, and operational autonomy of the Ethics Body. These provisions offer stronger guarantees for impartial evaluation of the conduct of Members and officials, and they help restore trust between citizens and European institutions.
🗓️ III – Thursday, 19 June 2025
- Memory Policy and Rail Safety
Plenary – Tzitzikostas
🗂️ RSP – Commission Statement
📄 Two years after the Tempi rail tragedy
We are devastated that it took the loss of 57 lives to reveal what many already knew: a state unable to guarantee the safety of its own infrastructure, and a Union too hesitant to intervene where dysfunction is chronic. This is not simply a Greek failure — it is a European wake-up call.
Ave Europa therefore urge the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) to set up a dedicated ad hoc body with a clear and urgent mission: to assess the condition of rail infrastructure across Member States; to evaluate resilience and competitiveness in the sector; to scrutinise maintenance and safety practices; to identify cross-border bottlenecks; and to call on the European Commission for a concrete, costed plan to upgrade outdated systems — especially where neglect endangers lives. What is at stake is not red tape, but the credibility of Europe itself, in what citizens experience most tangibly: safety, mobility, and basic public responsibility.
- Clean Industry and Energy Transition
ITRE – — / Ribera
🗂️ RSP – Oral Question + Resolution
📄 Clean Industrial Deal
The Clean Industrial Deal, unveiled by the European Commission in 2025, marks a significant shift in the EU’s strategic approach to the green transition. It reframes decarbonisation not just as a climate imperative, but as an industrial and geopolitical necessity. By aligning competitiveness, electrification, and reindustrialisation, the CID lays the groundwork for a more sovereign and resilient European economic model. We welcome this evolution, which clearly responds to the shortcomings of past regulatory approaches and signals a more integrated industrial vision.
The economic architecture combines state aid, public procurement, innovation funding, and regulatory reform. Nearly €160 billion in financial instruments are mobilised, with plans for a new European Industrial Decarbonisation Bank, a reform of state aid rules, and an upcoming Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act to streamline permitting. The Deal aims to create demand for clean technologies through lead markets and to reduce industrial energy costs through reforms in electricity markets, taxation, and infrastructure. These are important steps—yet they must now be turned into fast, visible, and territorially fair results.
Compared to peer strategies—such as the Inflation Reduction Act (USA), Japan’s Green Transformation, South Korea’s Green New Deal, or Australia’s Net Zero Plan—the CID stands out for its comprehensive scope, but lags in fiscal firepower, speed of execution, and clarity of incentives. While others rely on bold, centralised, and investment-driven models, the EU still leans heavily on complex regulatory coordination. Ave Europa commend the progress made and the ambition outlined, but we believe the EU must now go further: by consolidating its financial tools, simplifying procedures, and embedding its industrial strategy in a truly global framework.
- AOB – Economy, Energy, Development, Cohesion, Rule of Law
BUDG / ECON – Negrescu, Mureşan
🗂️ INI – Implementation Report
📄 Recovery and Resilience Facility
The European Parliament’s resolution adopted under Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) acknowledges the exceptional nature of this instrument, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/241, as part of the Union’s economic response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the solidarity-driven recovery ambitions underpinning the NextGenerationEU programme.
The Parliament underscores that the RRF constitutes a historic precedent in terms of debt mutualisation and the use of EU-level financing to support national reform and investment plans based on a performance-oriented contractual logic. It recalls that the cost-independent financing mechanism relies on the achievement of pre-established milestones and targets, which condition disbursements by the Commission, under an assessment framework defined following the approval of National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs).
The Parliament considers that, despite its temporary nature, the RRF has demonstrated the Union’s capacity to swiftly mobilise large-scale financial support in response to exogenous shocks, while fostering economic and social convergence among Member States.
Nevertheless, the resolution stresses that the implementation of the instrument has revealed numerous structural, legal and administrative shortcomings. In particular, it highlights that the complexity of procedures, the divergence of national timelines and limited absorption capacity have led to a partial achievement of objectives by the end of 2024, with over 70% of milestones still pending. It further notes that many projects co-financed under the RRF are unlikely to be launched or completed within the prescribed deadlines, despite the extensions permitted under the REPowerEU chapter.
The Parliament observes that the RRF’s stabilising effect has been accompanied by significant support for public investment, accounting for roughly half of the increase in public investment recorded in the Union between 2019 and 2025. It welcomes the overall overachievement of climate and digital targets (42% for green investments, 26% for digital-related spending), while noting that these averages conceal significant national disparities.
It calls for a more precise assessment of contributions to environmental objectives, underlining the need to establish a common, transparent and verifiable methodology for impact measurement. It regrets that the social dimension, although present in certain plans, has been less developed, and that the concrete effects on employment, training, inequality reduction and territorial cohesion remain difficult to assess due to the lack of harmonised indicators.
The resolution emphasises governance, control and democratic accountability issues. It notes that the European Parliament was excluded from the evaluation phase of plans and payment requests, in contradiction with principles of transparency and accountability. It further recalls that the data transmitted by the Commission remain aggregated, incomplete and largely unexploitable for effective democratic oversight, particularly with regard to final beneficiaries and subcontractors. It expresses concern over the insufficiency of ex post audit mechanisms, the risk of double funding, and the difficulty in ensuring fund traceability in the absence of a unified reporting obligation.
The Parliament calls for the deployment of interoperable digital tools enabling automated control, linked to national systems and European databases on beneficial ownership. It requests that the Commission’s evaluation methodologies be made public and standardised, in order to prevent discrepancies in the treatment of Member States and ensure equality before Union law.
From a budgetary perspective, the resolution warns of the long-term sustainability of NGEU debt repayment, with annual costs estimated between EUR 25 and 30 billion starting in 2028. It reiterates that this commitment relies on the introduction of new own resources, a condition essential for preserving the budgetary balance of the Union, and criticises the Council’s delay in adopting the own resources package. It stresses that debt repayment must not jeopardise the financing of common policies or the level of European programmes under the next multiannual financial framework. It considers that the absence of dedicated resources would constitute a breach of the 2020 interinstitutional agreement and would undermine the Union’s long-term budgetary credibility.
Finally, the resolution outlines orientations for the future of performance-based financial instruments. It proposes, as a transitional measure, the targeted extension until 2028 of mature but uncommitted projects, subject to strict selection criteria. It calls for reflection on a permanent framework for supporting strategic European investment, drawing on the lessons of the RRF in terms of efficiency, simplification, stakeholder involvement and proportionality of administrative requirements.
It recommends that future instruments prioritise the delivery of European public goods, focusing on key sectors such as critical technologies, energy, defence, health and industrial resilience. It insists that any new initiative must, from the outset, incorporate transparent governance mechanisms, a robust legal framework, full involvement of the European Parliament, and strong systems for control, impact measurement and accountability. It reaffirms the need to coordinate national budgetary policies with European priorities, in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity, conditional solidarity and fiscal discipline.
For Ave Europa, the question of common debt must be addressed neither as a taboo nor as an automatic reflex. It is legitimate for the European Union to acquire borrowing capacity in times of crisis, in order to ensure its stability and responsiveness to exogenous shocks. However, it is equally imperative to draw a clear distinction between temporary, crisis-driven borrowing and a shift toward structural indebtedness that would become permanent by default, without strategic reassessment or reinforced democratic oversight.
The budgetary exception introduced by the RRF cannot become the new norm without a comprehensive reflection on the long-term sustainability of European debt, the quality of the projects financed, and the actual capacity of these investments to transform European economies. If Europe needs enhanced budgetary capacity, it equally needs rigour, transparency, and accountability in the use of its resources.
The Union must be able to invest in genuine European public goods, but such investments must be supported by robust selection and monitoring mechanisms that ensure economic, industrial and social leverage, rather than a sequence of expenditures with no lasting effect. The goal is to prevent the Union from entering a prolonged debt cycle, with internal crowding-out effects, similar to those experienced by certain Member States due to a lack of selectivity and expenditure control.
Ave Europa therefore advocates for a clear-sighted and demanding approach: yes to responsible European investment capacity; no to systemic indebtedness that would dilute the common interest through ineffective resource allocation. This requires budgetary steering based on the strategic value of projects, strengthened fund traceability, full involvement of the European Parliament, and governance grounded in efficiency, sustainability, and equity among Member States.
- ITRE – Stürgkh / Jørgensen
🗂️ INI – Normal INI
📄 Electricity grids: backbone of the EU energy system
The European Parliament resolution entitled Electricity Grids: The Backbone of the European Union’s Energy System (2025/2006(INI)) sets out a comprehensive call to modernize, expand, and digitalize Europe’s electricity grids. With electricity demand projected to rise by 60% by 2030 and over 40% of distribution infrastructure already obsolete, the resolution states that the EU must invest nearly €584 billion by 2030 to upgrade its grid system. It emphasizes the integration of renewable energy, the deployment of smart grids, improved cross-border planning, and the reform of existing regulatory and financial frameworks. The text also highlights cybersecurity, physical resilience, cooperation with non-EU countries, and the need to anticipate the upskilling of the sector’s workforce.
The resolution coherently addresses the multiple dimensions of the electricity transformation: strategic planning (TEN-E, ACER), congestion relief (curtailments), financing (CEF-E, ETS), innovation (smart grids, flexibility), employment (a 50% increase in workforce needs), and supply security.
The amendments tabled by political groups reflect various lines of division. The EPP supports administrative simplification and a competitive vision without excessive climate constraints; the S&D group prioritizes a balance between green transition and social cohesion; Renew favours integrated markets and technological efficiency; the Greens focus on governance and procedural legitimacy. More sovereignty-oriented groups like PfE and ECR oppose further centralisation of energy governance, often without offering operational alternatives. Far-right positions appear largely symbolic, and at times disconnected from the structural realities of the sector.
Ave Europa fully supports the European Parliament’s ambitions in terms of decarbonisation, energy resilience, and the development of a modern, interconnected European electricity grid. However, it proposes a distinct pathway, based on a clear hierarchy of technologies.
Onshore wind, despite its widespread deployment, has not proven its long-term sustainability. Its high embedded carbon, current non-recyclability, emerging environmental nuisances (noise, biodiversity impact, land fragmentation), and increasing visual disruption raise fundamental questions about its place in Europe’s energy mix.
Ave Europa therefore advocates for a strategy that prioritizes smart grids, nuclear power as a dispatchable backbone of decarbonisation, and integrated urban solar—technologies that are compatible with high-density territories and the preservation of agricultural land.
In contrast to the text’s implicit technology-neutral approach, Ave Europa calls for targeted investment in solutions that combine industrial value, minimal land use, and high innovation potential. It supports the responsible development of offshore wind—particularly in the North Seas—provided it is accompanied by robust hybrid interconnections and a stable regulatory framework. In sum, Ave Europa shares the strategic objectives of the resolution—grid modernisation, flexibility, and energy sovereignty—but promotes a model of electrification that protects the landscape and avoids dependency on industrial technologies with poorly managed externalities.
- DEVE – Goerens / Síkelá
🗂️ INI – Normal INI
📄 Financing for development (Seville conference)
The report (2025/2004(INI)) on financing for development – ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville opens with a dense set of recitals that structure a global diagnosis of development issues, successively addressing the structural state of the world, the debt crisis, internal challenges of developing countries, the shortcomings of the global financial architecture, and ongoing regressions.
It reiterates the UN framework (Sustainable Development Goals, Addis Ababa Action Agenda, Paris Agreement), recalls the obligations of the European Union under Article 208 of the TFEU, and notes the collective failure to achieve the SDGs, with only 17% of targets currently on track. It underscores the scale of persistent inequalities, rising extreme poverty, the inadequacy of sustainable financing, and new tensions caused by food insecurity and the gradual disengagement of international donors.
It highlights the entanglement of fiscal and debt crises, with nearly 20% of public revenues in low-income countries devoted to debt servicing, and warns of the growing influence of private or non-aligned creditors, notably China. The critique extends to the entire Bretton Woods legacy, deemed incapable of addressing the needs of a multipolar world, to the detriment of the Global South. The section also denounces the conditionalities imposed by the IMF, the increasing militarisation of development aid, reductions in public budgets for international assistance, the American withdrawal, and the destabilising effects of fragmented global governance.
This opening segment constitutes a structured indictment of the systemic failures of the international development system, blending empirical diagnostics, legal references, and geopolitical critiques. The first chapter, devoted to principles and objectives, affirms the need to redesign the development framework through a comprehensive structural reform and the democratisation of international financial governance. It calls for a strengthened leadership role for the European Union, strict alignment with the SDGs, reinforced policy coherence, and the exploration of innovative fiscal sources.
The inclusiveness of partnerships, civil society participation, and accountability become structuring pillars. The second chapter, focused on debt, calls for the establishment of a multilateral UN framework for restructuring, critiques the asymmetries between public and private creditors, and insists on the importance of fair treatment without macroeconomic conditionalities, with specific attention to gender dimensions. It calls for better interinstitutional cooperation and the establishment of binding legal frameworks to ensure the participation of private creditors in restructuring mechanisms.
The third chapter, on reforming the global financial architecture, aims to redefine the role and mandates of multilateral development banks, introduce state-contingent debt clauses linked to climate shocks, redistribute IMF Special Drawing Rights according to differentiated responsibility principles, and increase transparency, participation, and equity in international governance. It also proposes stronger regulation of financial markets, commodity flows, and digital transactions to align them with social and environmental goals.
The following chapter, focusing on the private sector and finance, acknowledges the importance of public-private partnerships while highlighting their limitations in fragile contexts. It criticises the opacity of the Global Gateway, calls for a rebalancing of investor rights and obligations, and for better integration of local SMEs and regional authorities. The entire framework is conditioned on the attainment of the SDGs, social justice, and the protection of human rights, including the rights of persons with disabilities.
The fifth chapter, dealing with international tax cooperation, criticises the limitations of the OECD framework, calls for the creation of a UN tax convention, supports fairer global taxation, the fight against illicit financial flows, and the taxation of ultra-high-net-worth individuals and extractive industries. It also proposes a global beneficial ownership registry and the digitalisation of tax administrations in partner countries.
The sixth and final chapter, centred on official development assistance, presents a stark assessment of the decline in ODA, denounces the failure to meet international commitments (0.7% of GNI), and stresses the importance of budgetary coherence, education as a central pillar, support for UNRWA, and gender mainstreaming. It calls for enhanced parliamentary oversight of instruments such as NDICI–Global Europe and proposes a renewed global governance in response to the US withdrawal and increasing fragmentation of development actors.
The concluding section and the rapporteur’s statement highlight the urgency of addressing structural blockages in development financing, the strategic opportunity presented by the American retreat (USAID) for a European repositioning, the collective responsibility of Member States in fulfilling their commitments, and the crucial role of civil society organisations as vectors of genuine development. The Goerens Report (A10-0101/2025) is a dense, critical, and reformist political doctrine.
It lays out a dual strategic vision: on the one hand, the comprehensive reform of the UN, fiscal, monetary and financial system in a more just, sustainable, and democratic direction; on the other hand, the reinforced responsibility of the European Union as a balancing power in a multipolar world. The text relies on solid legal architecture, an ambitious strategic vision, precise data, and concrete proposals (UN debt framework, international tax cooperation, SDG taxonomy, Baku-Belem roadmap).
Ave Europa’s view on report A10-0101/2025, led by Charles Goerens (Renew), acknowledges the intellectual and moral ambition of the text, but also highlights its ideological bias and political imbalances. The resolution follows a developmentalist tradition with a strong alter-globalist tone, marked by a structural critique of the international economic system, a call for radical reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, and a strong focus on debt, tax justice, and fairness in global governance. While this approach responds to demands for justice, it also reveals a left-leaning orientation that led to the rejection of the text by the EPP group, allowing a majority to form among the left, the Greens, and Renew.
Ave Europa shares some of the EPP’s concerns: the resolution grants excessive importance to multilateral institutional engineering at the expense of genuine accountability of partner countries; it tends to reduce development policy to a catalogue of moral demands without outlining a clear strategy to help countries emerge from dependency or to strengthen their state capacities. By placing the main burden of responsibility on Western donors and by insisting on debt cancellation or delinking aid from reform conditions, the text risks perpetuating a logic of dependency rather than promoting economic sovereignty.
Moreover, while the call for fairer taxation is legitimate, the text overlooks the practical limitations of implementing such reforms in partner countries with weak institutions. Ave Europa would have preferred a more demanding approach towards recipients: conditioning support on clear commitments to good governance, anti-corruption, institutional strengthening, and regional integration.
The text also lacks a strategic vision for development as a lever for European influence, geopolitical stability, and the promotion of our values on the global stage. It fails to sufficiently consider the North–South co-prosperity dimension, favouring a redistributive logic in which the EU appears more as a global repairer than as a strategic partner assuming its role as a balancing actor.
Ave Europa, by contrast, defends a development policy that combines solidarity, mutual interest, and strategic projection of European influence, focusing on the upgrading of partner economies, training, productive investment, and integration into shared value chains. In short, while the Goerens report offers useful contributions to the reconstruction of an ambitious development policy, it suffers from doctrinal imbalance and a lack of strategic anchoring. Ave Europa calls for reorienting this policy towards a logic of accountability, effective partnerships, and contribution to organised co-prosperity, where Europe assumes its driving role not as a guilty actor, but as a transformative power.
- REGI – Nesci / Fitto
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📄 Strengthening rural areas through cohesion policy
The report A10-0092/2025 on strengthening rural areas in the European Union through cohesion policy, drafted by Denis Nesci for the REGI committee (2024/2105(INI)), opens with a series of recitals that establish the conceptual and statistical framework of the resolution.
These recitals highlight the demographic weight of rural areas, home to 137 million citizens—one-third of the EU population—and point to persistent inequalities, with rural incomes 12.5% lower than those in urban areas and access to essential services remaining limited. Structural specificities are underscored, including desertification, demographic decline, youth exodus, gender inequality, energy poverty, and climate-related vulnerabilities.
The text navigates a delicate balance between the strategic role of agriculture—for autonomy, biodiversity, and climate resilience—and the economic hardships faced by the sector.
A strong legal foundation is established through references to Articles 174 and 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, reaffirming both the priority of reducing regional disparities and the recognition of structural disadvantages. The tone of the recitals is alarmist but structured, presenting a multifaceted diagnosis of the social, economic, environmental, and institutional challenges affecting rural Europe while underlining the neglected strategic importance of these territories.
Although the operative part of the resolution is not formally structured into chapters, a clear analytical organisation emerges through seven thematic axes. The first is a general political vision articulated in several articles, which takes as central references the EU’s Long-Term Vision for Rural Areas to 2040 (COM(2021)0345 and COM(2024)0450).
This vision is grounded in a dual political claim: the recognition of rural territories as structuring pillars of the European economy, autonomy, cultural heritage and environmental stewardship, and the need to reorient public policies to end their marginalisation.
This includes full application of the principle of rural proofing and of Articles 174 and 175 TFEU. At its core, the resolution frames cohesion as a “right to stay,” anchoring territorial equality within the broader framework of fundamental rights. This section reads as a structured institutional plea built around the principle of territorial justice and equitable access to services, envisioning the EU as a rebalancing force in the face of market-driven inequalities.
The second axis focuses on agriculture, strategic autonomy, and the green transition. It presents strong support for short supply chains, quality labels, cooperatives and agricultural innovation. The resolution calls for a fair, gradual and inclusive reform of the green transition, with compensatory measures and safeguards against unfair competition through the imposition of normative equivalence in trade agreements.
A stark warning is issued regarding the projected disappearance of 6.4 million farms by 2040 and the increasing concentration of land ownership. This part of the resolution aligns closely with the positions of farmers’ unions and several Member States, advocating for the preservation of the family farming model, upholding the principle of subsidiarity, and calling for a counterweight to the centralising thrust of the Green Deal and Industrial Green Deal.
The third thematic area addresses energy transition, environmental challenges and climate resilience. It supports the development of local renewable energy sources, while insisting on safeguards regarding land use. Emphasis is placed on sustainable water management, climate adaptation plans, and disaster risk prevention. The integration of dams, levees and soft infrastructure into cohesion policy is also advocated. This section offers a pragmatic interpretation of the green transition, privileging territorial resilience and the reinforcement of rural infrastructure over ideological commitments, with a preference for hybrid approaches that combine engineered infrastructure with nature-based solutions.
In terms of public services, health, and infrastructure, the resolution insists on universal access to essential services—healthcare, housing, mobility, education, and digital infrastructure. Particular attention is paid to telemedicine, rural pharmacies, and multi-modal transport systems (road, rail, maritime). Investment in the renovation of public buildings and the provision of affordable housing is encouraged. This segment of the text asserts a strong social dimension, affirming the principle of effective equality in access to social rights and explicitly challenging the erosion of public services in rural regions. The spirit of this section reflects the doctrine of universal service, adapted to territorial needs.
On digital transition, innovation, SMEs, and employment, the resolution underscores the importance of digital connectivity (5G, precision agriculture, rural innovation hubs) and supports rural entrepreneurship. It advocates targeted financial support for rural SMEs, start-ups and remote workers, with a particular focus on empowering youth and women. This reflects a systemic approach that interweaves cohesion policy with territorial innovation, social equity, and intergenerational justice. The “smart villages” concept is introduced as a territorial expression of the smart specialisation strategy (S3), aiming to harness innovation for rural revitalisation.
The resolution devotes significant attention to youth, women, education, and equality. It prioritises the needs of rural youth in terms of education, access to finance, housing and intergenerational farm transfer. It expresses strong support for rural women through measures promoting pay equity, protection from violence, improved care infrastructure, and female entrepreneurship. The text rejects the closure of rural schools, underlining their social, cultural, and civic importance. This well-developed section highlights the convergence of territorial cohesion and social inclusion policies, with an emphasis on the long-term sustainability of rural communities.
Regarding governance, simplification, indicators and the future of cohesion policy, the resolution makes several recommendations for the post-2027 period. These include maintaining cohesion policy at its current level of budgetary ambition, the development of new indicators beyond GDP, and the reinforcement of multi-level governance tools such as EGTCs, ITIs, CLLDs, and the LEADER programme. It calls for administrative simplification through streamlined procedures, one-stop shops, and increased pre-financing. This section constitutes an implicit critique of the excessive complexity of the current multiannual financial framework and structural fund architecture, advocating for a more pragmatic and territorially responsive implementation.
The final vote in the REGI committee adopted the report by a broad majority. The AGRI committee issued a favourable opinion broadly aligned with the Nesci approach. Stakeholders consulted during the drafting process included local action groups (LAGs), regional committees, and organisations representing farmers and rural youth. Taken as a whole, the report lays the foundations for an ambitious and transversal political reset of rural policy within the post-2027 cohesion framework. It seeks to position rural territories not as problems to be solved but as drivers of the ecological, digital and social transitions. It affirms a strong commitment to real subsidiarity, simplification and effective decentralisation, and strikes a carefully constructed balance between territorial justice and rural modernisation, embracing employment, innovation and social cohesion.
The amendments to resolution A10-0092/2025 aim to strengthen its strategic coherence, differentiated territorial anchoring, and political scope in the field of cohesion policy. The addition of recital Aa immediately establishes a strategic linkage between cohesion funds and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), with the objective of consolidating an integrated approach to rural development. It highlights the complementarity between the CAP’s second pillar funding and ERDF/ESF+ instruments—an approach often supported by Member States with dispersed agricultural structures—and reaffirms the need to preserve this dual architecture at a time when recentralising tendencies are resurfacing in some European debates.
Several amendments deepen the strategic focus on autonomy, food sovereignty, and the resilience of agricultural systems. Recitals E, Ea, Eb and the newly added paragraph 9a stress the importance of reducing agricultural imports, enhancing the value of ecosystem services provided by farmers, and simplifying the procedures associated with the ecological transition. Recital Eb calls for the integration of farmers into a co-construction approach, rather than subjecting them to top-down standards. Paragraph 9a acknowledges the positive contribution of agriculture to climate action, while demanding fair compensation in line with the doctrine that positive externalities should be treated as public goods. These proposals align closely with the positions put forward by European agricultural unions (such as Copa-Cogeca), particularly in France, Italy, and Spain.
Other amendments enrich the understanding of regional disparities by emphasising the notion of “development traps,” introduced in recital F. They reinforce the idea that development trajectories are non-linear and call for increased differentiation in policy responses, according to the degree of vulnerability and the structural bottlenecks specific to certain territories.
On the demographic front, amendments Ga and Gb, as well as paragraphs 11 and 11a, lay the groundwork for a clear “right to stay” doctrine in rural areas. They rely on concrete indicators: the high average age of farmers (57), rural youth outmigration, and the rapid growth of peri-urban rural areas. Amendment Gb draws attention to these hybrid zones, which are often overlooked in cohesion policy classifications. Paragraphs 11 and 11a structure a targeted political response, activating cohesion instruments to facilitate access to land, credit, training, and employment for rural youth.
The issue of gender equality is addressed through a new amendment grounded in precise Eurostat data. The text highlights a 13-point employment gap and a rural female labour participation rate of just 31.6% in 2022. This situation justifies targeted measures: support for female entrepreneurship, administrative simplification, access to childcare services, and the promotion of professional equality as a key driver of rural development.
Two significant amendments (10a and 10b) focus on public services. The first calls for the creation of a dedicated fund for early childhood in rural areas, linked to the European Child Guarantee. The second proposes a specific emergency fund for rural disasters (especially drought and extreme weather events). These proposals aim to address two key social priorities: improving rural residential attractiveness through childcare services, and strengthening territorial resilience to local crises, as a complement to existing instruments such as the EU Solidarity Fund or the agricultural crisis reserve.
Amendments related to the digital transition (Ha, 10b, 10) underscore the scale of the technological divide: only 47.5% of rural residents possessed basic digital skills in 2022. The revised resolution calls for training—particularly for young people and farmers—raises awareness about dependency risks on certain technologies and the vulnerabilities tied to agricultural data collection, and advocates for a digital transition conceived as a development lever, not a constraint. Special attention is given to the risks of over-indebtedness and data exploitation.
On the energy front, amendment 10c supports the development of locally sourced renewable energy, particularly biomass, provided it does not harm ecosystems. This proposal rests on three conditions: territorial value, food security, and social cohesion. It offers the potential for supplementary income for rural producers while strengthening the circular economy.
A pivotal amendment (6c) marks a clear shift in governance. It explicitly rejects any strategy of recentralisation in fund management, in defence of the partnership principle. This stance aligns with the defence of the dual-pillar model (CAP/cohesion) and reasserts the need to maintain tools adapted to each type of territory. It pushes back against technocratic, centralised governance that would undermine local participation.
Finally, amendments Ia and 13c promote economic diversification beyond agriculture by supporting the circular economy, sustainable tourism, and local food systems. They highlight the role of public procurement (e.g., school canteens, hospitals) as a means of structuring short supply chains. This approach enhances the economic and social resilience of rural territories while advancing relocalisation strategies compatible with the green transition.
Together, these amendments converge around a shared ambition: to strengthen inter-fund and inter-policy coherence (CAP, cohesion, climate, digital), to embed public policies in territorially differentiated contexts, to articulate food sovereignty, resilience, and just transition, to reject technocratic centralisation in favour of subsidiarity, and to prepare the next generation of post-2027 cohesion policy with differentiated, targeted instruments focused on youth, women, SMEs, and local infrastructure.
Ave Europa welcomes the quality of the adopted text, but above all the quality of the work carried out in committee. Adopted by an overwhelming majority, this resolution reflects a rare and valuable spirit of unanimist compromise, the result of rigorous parliamentary dialogue that respects all political and territorial sensibilities. It is a strong example of what the European Parliament can achieve when it places itself in the service of the territories.
Today, rural cohesion is more than a sectoral issue: it is a condition for democratic legitimacy. The recent elections in Poland have once again demonstrated how the divide between europhiles and eurocritics too often overlaps with lifestyle fractures between urban centres and rural areas. If Europe is to remain a shared project, it must see rural regions not as peripheries, but as its living heart.
Guaranteeing the right to a good life “in one’s homeland” – where one is born, chooses to stay, or chooses to return – must be the foundation of a cohesion policy that is neither technocratic nor condescending.
There is no “urban Europe” opposed to an “anti-Europe of the countryside.” There is only one European people, in all its diversity, who must be heard, protected and supported – in its capitals as well as its villages, in its metropolises as well as its valleys. Only on this basis can the European Union once again become a project of belonging: rooted, balanced, and fair.
- LIBE – Mendes / McGrath
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📄 2024 Rule of Law report
The EU Commission’s Rule of Law Report has become a cornerstone of the Union’s institutional architecture since 2020, aiming to monitor, assess, and safeguard democratic standards across Member States. Introduced in response to systemic breaches in Hungary and Poland, it now provides an annual evaluation of justice systems, anti-corruption efforts, media pluralism, and institutional checks and balances. We welcome the Commission’s commitment to transparency and accountability, and we recognise the Rule of Law Report as a valuable instrument of European cohesion and trust.
The mechanism combines expert analysis, national contributions, and civil society input to issue country-specific recommendations. Encouragingly, implementation is improving: 68% of 2023 recommendations have been acted upon, showing the growing credibility of this tool. Reforms in Poland and Bulgaria demonstrate its potential to support constructive change. However, persistent resistance in Hungary and Slovakia reveals the limits of conditionality alone. That’s why we support not only maintaining pressure, but also strengthening enforcement mechanisms, streamlining EU legislation, and ensuring that rule of law standards reflect both institutional fairness and national realities.
From a comparative perspective, the Rule of Law Report remains an essential but incomplete tool. At Ave Europa, we have been concerned since the onset of the rule of law crisis—a crisis that is far from over. The continued lack of progress in Hungary, and the recent electoral victory of an openly eurosceptic candidate in Poland, illustrate how fragile the rule of law remains, even in core EU countries.
The challenge we face is twofold: ensuring that Europe is not perceived as a foreign or punitive power, while at the same time reaffirming the rule of law as the foundation of European cooperation. This means developing mechanisms that incentivise reform without punishing populations, and building public legitimacy around common standards. The credibility of the Union depends on our ability to navigate this tension—with firmness, but also with political intelligence and democratic sensitivity.
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📄 Welfare of dogs and cats: strengthening traceability and animal protection in the EU
The proposed regulation COM(2023)0769, adopted on 7 December 2023, aims to establish a harmonised legal framework at the European Union level for the welfare of dogs and cats, by regulating their breeding, sale, keeping, traceability, and importation. The text responds to a context marked by strong civic and associative mobilisation in the face of the proliferation of illegal breeding operations, the growth of untraceable online sales, and the absence of common standards within the internal market.
It follows a “One Health” approach, linking animal health, public health, biodiversity, and consumer protection. The European Commission thus intends to ensure a common welfare baseline applicable to all establishments (breeders, shelters, sellers), to guarantee complete traceability of animals through identification and registration, to strictly regulate breeding practices, and to strengthen the fight against illegal trade, especially through online platforms.
Legally, the text is structured into eight chapters.
Chapter I defines the scope of the regulation (breeding, sale, sheltering) and provides essential legal definitions, including a distinction between professional establishments and non-commercial private individuals. Chapter II sets out general obligations concerning animal welfare, including housing conditions, behavioural enrichment, veterinary care, and prohibits certain practices such as tail docking, ear cropping, and the use of coercive collars, in line with veterinary doctrine based on the five domains of animal welfare.
Chapter III governs breeding practices through a strict regime based on age, frequency of litters, and bans on hybridisation and inbreeding, except in duly justified derogations for the conservation of local breeds. The Commission reserves the right, via delegated acts, to regulate excessive morphological traits of certain breeds from 2026 to 2030.
Chapter IV makes it mandatory to identify dogs and cats using electronic transponders (microchips), with flexibility in the case of veterinary contraindications. Each animal must be registered in a national database interoperable with a coordinated European system. Veterinarians will be responsible for registering the animal before it can be placed on the market.
Chapter V requires all establishments to notify their activity, with prior approval required for more than five litters per year or five breeding females. However, non-commercial donations are excluded, and a distinction is made between occasional breeders and professional operations, in line with the principle of proportionality.
Chapter VI specifically addresses online commerce and importation. It requires prior verification of identifiers before publishing online ads and imposes a dual requirement for imported animals: microchipping and registration within five days of entry, or prior notification in a dedicated database managed by the Commission. Chapter VII lays out control obligations by competent authorities and leaves it to Member States to define applicable penalties. Finally, Chapter VIII contains the final provisions, including delegated powers for future adaptations and an entry into force set two years after adoption.
Ave Europa fully supports this regulation proposal, which it considers ambitious, balanced, and legally robust.
The text responds to a strong societal demand while respecting the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. European harmonisation of the rules is both necessary and welcome, especially to put an end to intra-European trafficking of unregistered animals or those raised in substandard conditions.
The differentiated approach based on the size of the operation protects individuals and small-scale occasional breeders, while placing strong requirements on professional operators.
Strengthening control over online advertisements marks a decisive step in curbing illegal channels. The bans on mutilations, regulation of overbreeding, and supervision of aesthetic competitions represent a clear improvement in the legal framework.
This regulation represents a significant step forward in animal welfare, the fight against trafficking, and consumer protection. It sets out common minimum standards while granting Member States reasonable room for adaptation. Ave Europa supports this text both in principle and in substance, convinced that it embodies a European policy based on responsibility, transparency, and the protection of the most vulnerable—including animals.
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📄 Macro-financial assistance to Egypt: strategic support for stability and resilience
The proposal for a Decision 2024/0071(COD) of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt comes at a time of heightened regional instability, marked by the war in Gaza, attacks in the Red Sea, the ongoing consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and significant internal macroeconomic vulnerability in Egypt.
The country is facing a high public debt level of 96.4% of GDP, inflation exceeding 30%—particularly affecting food prices—severe tensions in the foreign exchange market, with a large gap between the official and parallel exchange rates before the currency float in March 2024, and a structurally weak balance of payments despite a slight increase in foreign reserves.
The combined recourse to the International Monetary Fund, through an extended programme of USD 8 billion, and to the European Union, via this macro-financial assistance (MFA) totalling EUR 5 billion, aims to provide a coordinated response to an emerging sovereign solvency crisis, even as foreign direct investment—especially from the United Arab Emirates—has started to return, though more in a bilateral than a structural framework.
The main objective of the proposed assistance is to help close Egypt’s external financing gap, estimated at USD 17.7 billion for the period 2024–2027. In the medium term, the MFA is intended to stabilise public finances, support a trajectory of structural reforms—including in privatisation, monetary policy, and public financial management—and restore a conducive environment for the return of private capital flows.
The disbursement of this assistance will occur in three installments, each conditioned on the effective implementation of the IMF programme and on the fulfillment of specific reforms to be agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the European Commission and the Egyptian authorities.
The legal and institutional framework for this operation is based on Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which enables the Union to provide economic assistance to third countries. The proposal follows the ordinary legislative procedure with parliamentary oversight and covers a two-and-a-half-year period (2025–2027). Financial support will take the form of long-term repayable loans (up to 35 years with a grace period), without sectoral earmarking, and backed by a 9% provisioning under the NDICI – Global Europe instrument, amounting to EUR 360 million. This is presented as an exceptional instrument, activated in the context of extreme vulnerability of a strategic partner, and subject to dual monitoring: ex ante operational assessment of financial circuits and ex post evaluation within two years after the end of the programme.
This assistance is part of a broader cooperation architecture between the European Union and Egypt, marked by the conclusion in January 2024 of a Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership. This partnership builds on the 2021–2027 priorities, centred on economic modernisation, regional stability, migration management, security, and respect for fundamental rights. The MFA complements and reinforces the instruments already mobilised under NDICI, including grants, guarantees, and technical assistance, with the goal of strengthening the overall coherence and leverage of the EU’s external action in the Southern Neighbourhood.
The proposal places strong emphasis on political conditionality. Compliance with the rule of law, human rights, and a pluralistic parliamentary system is a prerequisite for the release of funds. Despite serious and persistent concerns—such as arbitrary detentions, prolonged state of emergency, and abusive use of pre-trial detention—the Commission considers that certain limited but meaningful steps have been taken: the adoption of a National Human Rights Strategy, the relaunch of a national dialogue, the release of political prisoners, greater engagement in international forums, and active cooperation with both the EU and the United Nations. The proposal nonetheless includes a clear safeguard clause: should there be any backsliding or stagnation on political and economic criteria, the assistance may be suspended or cancelled.
From a critical perspective, the mechanism presents several strengths: clear targeting of urgent macroeconomic needs, budgetary flexibility through the use of loans rather than grants, good coordination with international financial institutions, and alignment with a coherent regional EU strategy focused on stability, resilience, and Mediterranean cooperation.
However, significant limitations must be noted. There is limited transparency in the actual implementation of reforms, particularly regarding the real disengagement of the state and military from the economy. The risk of moral hazard—that is, the indirect use of EU funds to finance non-reforming expenditures—is real. Furthermore, the slow pace of progress in fundamental freedoms and political pluralism continues to raise concerns about the consistency between stated objectives and institutional reality.
Proposal 2024/0071(COD) thus appears geopolitically timely and macroeconomically sound, but politically uncertain. Its success will depend closely on the rigorous monitoring ensured by the European Commission and the European Parliament, on the effective fulfilment by the Egyptian authorities of their commitments in terms of reforms and governance, and on the quality of coordination with other international donors involved in stabilising the Egyptian economy.
For Ave Europa, Egypt is an indispensable partner in North Africa. While the country continues to face deep structural delays, the Union’s action must focus first and foremost on the levers that will allow Egypt to uplift its population, its infrastructure, and its institutional functioning. Egypt’s stability is a strategic imperative, especially in light of the chaotic situation in Libya. Everything must be done to support this state, whose role is not only central to North Africa but to the entire Mediterranean basin. Egypt has shown itself to be a reliable actor in security terms; it is now essential to deepen the partnership across all dimensions — political, economic, social, and energy-related — so that a strong and stable Egypt can exert a stabilising influence across its regional environment.
